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A "NEW BREEZE" OR THE WINDS OF OLD? 
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
Alan K. Henrikson 
On Friday, January 20, 1989, the new President of the 
United States, George Herbert Walker Bush, acknowledged 
in his inaugural address that he was assuming office in 
unusually favorable historical circumstances. "I come before 
you and assume the presidency at a moment filled with 
promise," he said. "We live in a peaceful, prosperous time, 
but we can make it better. For a new breeze is blowing, 
and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn; for in 
man's heart, if not in fact, the day of the dictator is over. 
The totalitarian era is passing, its oíd ideas blown away like 
leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree."^ 
President Bush was able to declare, as neither Dwight 
Eisenhower at an earlier time of "peace" and "prosperity" ñor 
his own immediate predecessor, Ronald Reagan, could have 
done when assuming office, that the long ideological 
struggle waged by the United States for "freedom" against 
tyranny was nearing its end. Going even further, a newly 
appointed State Department planning officer, Francis 
Fukuyama, suggested that "The End of History" (with 
history regarded as a Hegelian dialectical process) had 
arrived. As Fukuyama grandly speculated, with a sense of 
triumph but also a tinge of regret: "What we may be 
witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the 
passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the 
end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western 
liberal democracy as the final form of human government."^ 
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Neither on the political right ñor on the political left, 
neither in defeated fascism ñor in failing communism, does 
the Bush administration perceive a serious rival, at least in 
the realm of ideas. As the President observed on January 
20, in words that merit quotation: 
Great nations of the world are moving 
toward democracy—through the door to 
freedom. Men and women of the world move 
toward free markets-through the door to 
prosperity. The people of the world agítate for 
free expression and free thought—through the 
door to the moral and intellectual satisfactions 
that only liberty allows. 
We know what works. Freedom works. 
We know what's right. Freedom is right. We 
know how to secure a more just and 
prosperous life for man on Earth—through free 
markets, free speech, free elections, and the 
exercise of free will, unhampered by the state. 
For the first time in this century--for the 
first time in perhaps all history--man does not 
have to invent a system by which to live. We 
don't have to talk late into the night about 
which form of government is better. We don't 
have to wrest justice from the kings; we only 
have to summon it from within ourselves. 
These propositions reflect traditional prejudices of 
Americans. They reveal the anti-mercantilist and anti-
monarchist impulses of their own colonial days within the 
British Empire. They also indícate the influence of 
subsequent American political concepts, including Woodrow 
Wilson's idea of national self-determination, Franklin 
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Roosevelt's humanitarian Four Freedoms, and Ronald 
Reagan's views regarding deregulation and privatization. 
President Bush's philosophical summary of recent events 
meaningfuUy can be read, in fact, as a recapitulation of the 
American national experience. Although ostensibly a 
description of actual progress in history, his interpretation 
also has the abstract quality of a list of eternal verities, of 
enduringly "self-evident" truths as Thomas Jefferson called 
them in the Declaration of Independence. In Bush's 
statement, the specific lessons of America's past are 
presented as general instructions for mankind's future.^ 
This idea that the universalization of liberal 
democracy and economy is a final historical achievement 
and, moreover, the ultímate validation of American 
principies of government is doubly dangerous. First, there 
is the risk that its dogmatic quality ("We know what works. 
. . . We know what's right.") will preclyde creative thought, 
by Americans and also by others, in response to entirely 
new problems now confronting the planet. Policies that 
have proved relatively successful in the United States, and 
in certain other advanced societies of the West and also the 
fringes of Asia, may not be applicable to the most urgent 
needs of other groups of nations. These include the 
countries now emerging from a disintegrating Soviet 
empire-with a strong desire for Western freedoms but also 
with a strong socialist ethos—and many countries of the 
Third World currently struggling with problems of 
underdevelopment and external indebledness."* Such 
countries, especially in the short run, may not be responsive 
to the panacea of American market democracy. 
A second, related risk involved in the Bush 
administration's faith in universal democratization and 
marketization arises from its faulty concept of historical 
causation. It attributes far too large a role to the mere 
philosophical acceptance by other societies of the superiority 
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of free speech and free enterprise. The American public can 
be led to assume, too easily, that betterment of the vvorld 
must occur more or less automatically—without the 
involvement of the state and, in particular, without 
American government involvement. The implication of such 
thinking is that help from the outside is not only 
unnecessary but also undesirable. The argument goes: it 
might detract from the recipients' self-reliance; it might 
prove materially too costly; and it might be viewed by third 
parties (i.e., the Soviet Union) as provocative. It would be 
a mistake, from this perspective, to try to "rush history 
along."^ Events should be allowed to take their course. 
II 
Such an outlook—emphasizing American ideáis rather 
than American pou^er-precludes an accurate assessment of 
the actual strength of the United States in international 
relations. The problem of America's "vvorld power" is a 
serious and a longstanding one. Because it suggests a 
possible explanation of the reluctance of President Bush in 
his inaugural speech to promise bold action-as John F. 
Kennedy, for instance, had pledged to "pay any price, bear 
any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose 
any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty"— 
this question of America's international strength deserves a 
brief opening comment.* 
If overestimated in certain times past, as in the "Pax 
Americana" period after Worid War II, America's national 
strength today seems more often to be underestimated. The 
United States is said to be in historical "decline," owing in 
part to a phenomenon that the British historian Paul 
Kennedy calis "imperial overstretch."^ This comparative-
historical assertion has deepened the concern of many 
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Americans, probably including some members of the Bush 
administration, about the capacity of the United States 
practically to meet its obligations--in Walter Lippmann's 
classic term, to maintain "solvency" between national 
resources and national policy.' In a "post-historical" age, 
when the glory of ideológica! victory fades, many other, 
more concrete, and perhaps more intractable problems-e.g., 
commercial, technological, and environmental concerns-will 
become visible and require solution by the United States. 
The material base of American competence, it is feared, no 
longer will be adequate to the task. 
This sense of America's historical descent from "worid 
leadership" has been sharpened in recent years by the 
implicit claims of Japan and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in particular, for "equal partnership" with the 
United States in certain international áreas. That is to say, 
"decline" is felt not only in relation to objective global 
problems but also in relation to other nations, vievved as 
"rivals" even though they are political allies. The fact that 
it is two countries that the United States helped to vanquish 
in World War II that are mounting the challenge 
compounds the American psychological problem of adjusting 
to a less predominant world role. 
The present tendency in the United States to 
sentimentalize the experience of "The Good War," during 
which issues were defined and enemies were known, is 
related to the "declinist" pathology." The fact that President 
Bush himself as a U.S. Navy torpedo-bomber pilot fought in 
Worid War Il-probably to be the last U.S. President to be 
a veteran of that conflict-is an important factor in his own 
makeup. It also is an element in the electoral support he 
has received. The "youngest aviator in the Navy when I 
got my wings," he pointed out in his campaign 
autobiography, Looking Forward, he earned the 
Distinguished Flying Cross after his airplane was shot down 
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in a mission against the Japanese-held island of Chichi Jima. 
He was the only member of his crew to survive." 
Bush's own recollection of the Second World War, in 
contrast with the prevailing nostalgia, is distinctly sober in 
tone. "There has been time for healing," he has reflected. 
'The West Germans and Japanese are two of our most 
important allies, even though sometimes we are passionate 
economic rivals." All wars are "terrible," in his view. "1 
know what it was like to be a 21-year-old kid out there in 
the middle of the Pacific Ocean, disoriented, nauseous, 
agonizing over the deaths of my closest friends, and 
terrorized by the thought of imminent capture," he 
remembers. "To some people war may appear glamorous 
and romantic in the history books, and it is tragic that each 
generation usually experiences severa! wars until it has had 
its fill of them. I suppose that's why 1 feel so strongly 
about maintaining a powerful defense--so that this country 
never has to go to war again."" 
How can an American "powerful defense"--capable 
not merely of resisting possible acts of aggression but of 
overawing any conceivable aggressor--today be afforded and 
maintained? And, to be sure, why is it necessary to have 
such a defense if the dominant forcé in present-day 
International affairs is American idealism-the country's 
espousal' of liberal democratic and economic principies? 
President Bush has been criticized for a lack of "visión."'^ 
No less important in explaining the seeming vacuity of his 
early foreign-policy statements, it might be speculated, is a 
confusión about the state of American power in the world. 
This factor may be a key to the future development of U.S. 
International policy under his leadership. Unless a realistic 
sense of "powerfulness" can be generated, partly from a 
recovery of America's own infernal dynamism and also 
partly from much greater synergisms of International 
cooperation with Japan and with the countries of Western 
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Europe, particularly the F.R.G., President Bush may fail to 
realize the full potential of the challenging opportunities 
that greeted him on Inauguration Day. 
To réstate the point succinctly, there was a 
temptation at the beginning of the new U.S. administration 
in January 1989, which President Bush's ideological 
interpretation of recent international events did little to 
inhibit, to treat such positive signs as democratic-reform 
efforts and free-market experiments in the "totalitarian" 
world as a consequence and a confirmation of the American 
example. The ideological conversión of the world, by dint 
of America's own past success and good fortune, was 
conceived as being almost a self-executing task—a product of 
others' deciding to share the American faith, rather than of 
the U.S. government's own action upon it. 
ni 
George Bush was not, of course, complacent. 
Inactivity was contrary to his energetic nature. "America is 
never wholly herself unless she is engaged in high moral 
principie," he declared in his inaugural address, "We as a 
people have such a purpose today. It is to make kinder the 
face of the nation and gentler the face of the world. My 
friends, we have work to do." 
He specifically identified various domestic problems— 
the homeless, teenage mothers, neglected children, drug 
addicts-that urgently needed addressing. By citing these 
infernal concerns, President Bush tacitly acknowledged that 
attention to America's own social-welfare agenda was long 
overdue. "We will make the hard cholees, looking at what 
we have and perhaps allocating it differently," he said, 
hoping for some assistance from the American spirit of 
voluntarism ("a thousand points of light"). Stubbornly 
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refusing to recommend new taxes, he could gain the needed 
funds only by reducing other government expenses. That 
he recognized the importance of solvency (in Lippmann's 
sense) as the basis of the U.S. government's credibility 
abroad is evident. "We must bring the Federal budget into 
balance. We must ensure that America stands before the 
world united-strong, at peace, and fiscally sound." 
Partly for this reason, the passages of the Bush 
inaugural speech dealing with international affairs were not 
as concrete as those concerning domestic affairs. Beyond a 
general commitment to maintain "unity" and "strength" in 
facing the world, he said comparatively little that had actual 
programmatic content. The first foreign-related subject he 
mentioned was the problem of U.S. citizens "held against 
their wiU"-the hostages-and U.S. citizens "unaccounted 
for"~the missing in action-in foreign lands. He did not 
conceal his feeling of helplessness in dealing with these 
matters, inviting others' intercession. "Assistance can be 
shown here and will be long remembered. Good will 
begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly 
moves on." 
The dominant tone of his address was in fact 
conciliatory. Invoking a figura ti ve "statute of limitations," 
he declared an end to the American infernal división over 
the Vietnam War, wishing for a restoration of the bipartisan 
foreign-policy consensus that had made possible the Truman 
Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and North Atlantic Treaty. "The 
final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long 
afford to be sundered by a memory," he stated. "A new 
breeze is blowing, and the oíd bipartisanship must be made 
new again." 
In "the age of the offered hand," as he termed it, 
extemal adversarles, too, would be offered reconciliation. 
While etermined to "stay strong to protect the peace," Bush 
made it clear, as he consistently had done during his 
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campaign, that the country would negotíate from strength— 
but still negotiate. "The 'offered hand' is a reluctant fist," 
he said. "While keeping our alliances and friendships 
around the world strong--ever strong-we will continué the 
new closeness with the Soviet Union, consistent both with 
our security and with progress." He frankly admitted that 
there was risk involved in this: "One might say that our 
new relationship in part reflects the triumph of hope and 
strength over experience." 
Which tendency, one might ask, will predomínate in 
the Bush administration foreign policy: expectation or 
experience? Will that policy prove to be a fresh, "new 
breeze" of reconciliation at home and abroad, premised on 
the President's evident wish to let bygones be bygones and 
proceed to practical solutions and political cooperation? Or 
will it continué the stale, older winds of policy—laissez-faire 
economic theory, negotiation-from-strength diplomacy, and 
Cold War political morality? In short, what actually will be 
done with the "moment rich with promise" that the forty-
first U.S. President recognized in January 1989 was his to 
grasp? 
A comprehensive answer depends, first of all, on a 
careful assessment of the world situatíon that the Bush 
administration confronted. Second, it requires 4 cióse 
examination of what he and his colleagues indicated they 
wish to accomplish during their four (possibly eight) years 
in office. Third, it involves an evaluation of what, at this 
writing (in November 1989), the Bush administration 
actually has accomplished in trying to conform the world to 
its outíook. In the passages that foUow, I shall address 
these issues before returning to the initial question of the 
primary character of the Bush administration foreign policy: 
Is it fundamentally forward-looking or is it backward 
looking--brisk with modernity or befogged in tradition? 
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International conditions when George Bush took 
office did ¡n fact seem more propitious for U.S. diplomatic 
success than in any recent period—certainly since the 
Vietnam War and perhaps even since the Second World 
War. The most noteworthy positive development was, of 
course, the distinct improvement of Western relations with 
the Soviet Union and People,'s Republic China-the former 
undergoing glasnost and perestroika and the latter moving 
toward a more market-oriented society. The easy 
assumption at the time was that the Soviet Union's political 
"openness" would result, inevitably, in deeper economic 
restructuring, and that China's economic experiments would 
lead, ineluctably, to a more democratic political system. The 
two countries' reform programs would, so to speak, cross-
stimulate and thus work to complete each other. 
This first positive circumstance-the improvement of 
East-West relations—was most strikingly evident in the field 
of arms control. The December 1987 agreement providing 
for the total removal of intermediate-range nuclear torces 
(INF) from Europe, with its unprecedented measures for on-
site verification, seemed to foreshadow even more significant 
reductions in conventional forces and also nuclear weapons, 
both short-range and long-range. Many observers thought 
that the United States and Soviet Union might even achieve 
the utopian goal-initially floated by Ronald Reagan and 
Mikhail Gorbachev at the October 1986 Reykjavik Summit— 
of cutting in half, and later wholly eliminating, the two 
countries' strategic-weapons arsenals. That idea no longer 
seemed fanciful, even though some officials frankly did not 
want to envision it." For the first time since Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, it seemed nonetheless, mankind could see beyond 
the Nuclear Age, in which peace had depended partly on a 
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nuclear "balance of terror." 
The second favorable world development was the 
nearly simultaneous conclusión of cease-fire accords and 
disengagement agreements in regional wars—in Southwest 
Asia, in southern África, and in Central America. Peace, it 
then seemed, was breaking out all over. These 
arrangements, if faithfuUy adhered and fully implemented, 
promised to remove from the international agenda issues of 
regional violence that had exacerbated world politics for 
more than a decade. The successful negotiations— 
specifically those concerning Afghanistan, Irán and Iraq, 
>ÑIamibia and Angola, and Nicaragua—were not the only 
efforts being made. The fighting in Kampuchea, too, was 
under active international deliberation. So also was 
Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara. The "peace epidemic" 
of the time, as Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University 
commented, showed that the international system was 
placing "sharp limits" on the usefulness of military forcé." 
Closely associated with these regional discussions, 
both as a partial cause and as a partial effect of them, was 
the benign presence of the United Nations. For decades in 
eclipse, that organization in 1988 was awarded the Nobel 
Prize for Peace in recognition of its peacekeeping functions 
over the years. Moreover, with the United States, Soviet 
Union, and People's Republic of China-all permanent 
members of the UN Security Council--no longer at odds 
internationally, the UN suddenly seemed capable of being 
a place to do business. Its organizational efficiency was 
considerably improved. "Over the past several years, due in 
large part to congressional initiative," said a State 
Department official before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, "there has been some real progress throughout 
the UN system to reform both UN management and budget 
processes."*^ 
The third noteworthy positive international trend at 
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the beginning of the Bush administration was the rapid 
progress—much faster than had been expected—of the 
European Community (EC) tovvard its long-standing goal of 
a single unified market by approximately its target date of 
1992. The economic integration of Europe-including, 
ideally, Eastern Europe-had been a "cornerstone" of U.S. 
foreign policy since the time of the Marshall Plan. An 
"open and vibrant Europe," pointed out a U.S. official 
commentary, "reinforces the common bond of democracy, 
strengthens the Atlantic alliance, and can be a powerful 
engine for economic growth."'^ Moreover, it might have 
been added,an economically Consolidated Europe would be 
a peaceful Europe. With a new common identity, it no 
longer would be riven by rival national identities. 
An especially promising aspect of this new European 
construction, from the American perspective, was the 
ostensibly outward- rather than inward-looking 
expansionary emphasis of the EC's development. Europe's 
"economic space" progressively widened in 1981 with the 
admission to the Community of Greece and, in 1986, with 
the entry of Spain and Portugal. The inclusión of Spain, in 
particular, was heartening to the United States. The 
Spanish economy, in which many American firms had 
invested heavily owing to Spain's relatively low labor costs, 
was seen as a bridge to the rest of the continental market. 
By expanding and upgrading production facilities in Spain, 
U.S. companies hoped thereby to "conquer Europe."'^ 
A somewhat comparable regional economic 
development, also viewed by President Bush and his 
coUeagues warmly, was the U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA). This came into effect just as they took 
office, and the President's symbolic first foreign trip, 
appropriately, was to Canadá. The amount of trade in 
goods and services exchanged between the two North 
American countries during the previous year was $154 
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billion, making their bilateral relationship already the largest 
such two-way trade flow in the world. All remaining tariffs 
would be phased out by the end of the century. Certain 
elements of the FTA, particularly its provisions concerning 
Services and investment, could serve as models for wider 
international agreements. So too, it was thought, could the 
accord's novel comprehensive dispute-settlement 
mechanism." 
Washington and Ottawa hoped that their 
achievement, though only a bilateral pact, would have a 
strong exemplary effect on the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was 
progressing slowly and with difficulty. "The accord 
provides a powerful signal against protectionism and for 
trade liberalization," as the official Canadian commentary on 
the FTA asserted. "It reflects the commitment of both 
governments to liberalize trade on a global basis through 
multilateral negotiations under the GATT," A New York 
Times advertisement stated the point concisely: the U.S,-
Canada agreement is "clear evidence that the trade 
liberalization movement is still alive."" 
There were, of course, difficulties and constraints in 
each of these three positive international developments--in 
the East-West military, regional-political, and commercial-
economic spheres, respectively. Some of these problems 
briefly should be noted, lest the statesmanly task facing the 
Bush administration in 1989 be made to seem excessively 
simple or easy. A realistic standard by which to judge its 
historical success or failure is needed. 
The field of arms control has its own complications. 
A continuing problem with the arms talks under way in 
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Vienna and Geneva, warned Henry Kissinger, is that vital 
consideratíons of East-West security might be reduced to 
mere technical discussion and become stalemated at that 
lower conceptual level. To place the emphasis on "puré 
arms control," he went so far as to say, "gets us off the 
subject." To deal with the problem of conventional-arms 
control narrowly within the NATO-Warsaw Pact context 
risks turning the whole matter into "a numbers game that 
will feed on itself." Instead, he proposed, the United States 
and the Soviet Union should envision an arrangment 
between themselves that "separates the security issues from 
the political issues." If, for example, the governments of 
Eastern Europe were to accept clearly defined limits on their 
military capabilities, somewhat as Finland had done, they 
might more easily gain from the Soviet Union more room— 
if limited room—for the exercise of political freedoms.^ 
Given the widespread suspicion within the United 
States, especially among political conservatives, of the very 
idea of an agreement with Moscow that would impose 
restrictions of any kind on Eastern European countries, 
Kissinger's making this proposal ("Yalta II," critics called it) 
was somewhat hard to understand. "Finlandization" then 
seemed to many Americans to be tantamount to one-sided 
appeasement. Not surprisingly, such a strategy—trading 
acknowl^dgement of Soviet military power in Eastern 
Europe for the prospect of political pluralism there-was 
difficult for the Bush administration to accept. In any case, 
it was not at all obvious that it had to consider such a plan. 
"It seeks from the men in the Kremlin something they are 
already willing to grant—latitude for diversity and 
liberalization in the 'fraternal' countries of Eastern Europe," 
critically observed Strobe Talbott in Time magazine. "And 
it offers in return assurances that have little to do with the 
Soviets' real fears-political deterioration inside the bloc, not 
a military threat from outside."-' The "Yaíta 11" question 
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would continué, however, to haunt East-West discussions of 
security in Eastern Europe. 
The making of regional peace in the Third World 
also was full of pitfalls. Each of the various áreas afflicted 
by violence, most of them non-Western and not well known 
to most Americans, were deeply endemic and not readily 
amenable to outside influence. To move from short-term 
diplomatic accords to long-tern) political solutions surely 
would prove difficult, requiringthe imagination, knowledge, 
and, not least, continuous attention of the finest political 
minds. It was not at all certain that, in Washington or 
anywhere else, such world-ciass statesmanship was available. 
Even within the Western Hemisphere—the traditional 
domain of the Monroe Doctrine-the United States 
government found itself unabl? to fix peace. The U.S. 
government's failed efforts to remove General Manuel 
Antonio Noriega and restore tranquility to Panamá—and 
thus secure the canal-is a case in point. President Bush's 
reluctance to use large-scale forcé during the Panamanian 
officers' coup attempt early in October probably reflects not 
so much personal indecisiveness on his part as ¡t does his 
realistic appreciation of the likelihood that the U.S. 
government could not easily manage the situation in 
Panamá if its dictator were removed.-
There are difficult probipms as well that arise from 
the construction of regional trading entities, not only the 
European Community and the U.S.-Canadian free-trade 
partnership but also the emerging East Asian/Pacific 
economic formation led by Japan. Mutual suspicions 
between such apparent commercial "blocs" could degenerate 
into bitter, debilitating interregional conflict. The altercation 
early in 1989 between the United States and the EC over 
hormone-treated beef-a European import ban, U.S. 
retaliation by doubling import duties on European cheese 
and other food products, and a subsequent European 
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Community threat of "countermeasures"--illustrates the 
vicious cycle of charge and countercharge that can develop. 
A later controversy over an EC "Televisión Without 
Frontiers" directive, suggesting that more than fifty percent 
of the programs shown in Europe be European-made, is but 
another example.^ The image of "Fortress Europe" remains 
a vivid one in Americans' minds. Equally convinced is the 
belief of Europeans in American "protectionism." Both 
Americans and Europeans now are persuaded of the 
Japanese reliance on "structural" import restrictions. 
The possible "regionalizing" tendency of the world 
economy could make the process of multilateral trade 
negotiations within the GATT much more difficult. In 
effect, bloc-to-bloc bargaining might be needed, with the 
participants insisting hard on "reciprocal treatment" and 
"comparable effective market access." A particular concern 
of U.S. officials at present is that in the Uruguay Round the 
European Community might try to claim "credit" for the 
liberalizing effects of its internal market unification. The 
refusal by the U.S. government of such "credit" might be 
used to justify EC penalties. In other words, the U.S. 
government fears that Europe's 1992 market plan might be 
used to gain negotiating leverage, simply to accumulate 
bargaining chips. From Washington's perspective, the 
United States "paid" once in negotiating with Europe when 
the EC first was established, and should not have to do so 
again.^ Such clashes of attitude seriously could impede 
further movement toward a broad global trading system. 
VI 
The possible deadlocks that are developing in each of 
these three áreas—arms control, regional settlements, and 
trade negotiations—are not wholly unrelated to one another. 
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The reductíons now occurring in the levéis of the two 
superpowers' military forces, it has been argued, almost 
protnote political and economic demands by other countries 
that have been oppressed by the disciplines of the postwar 
world order—that is, the Cold War. The Bush 
administration thus is confronted with a manifold challenge. 
A major abatement of "the Soviet threat," the 
argument goes, tends to produce an increase in International 
difficulties of other kinds. This argument is stated with 
particular clarity by the strategist Edward N. Luttwak. In 
a New York Times article, "The Alliance, Without an 
Enemy," Luttwak postulates: "Americans, Europeans and 
Japanese are natural competitors. But in the past, none of 
their commercial and financial rivalries could become 
political rivalries because of the looming presence of a 
threatening Soviet Union. Strategic cooperation in the face 
of the common threat always had absolute priority." In the 
current period, however, with the Gorbachev regime upon 
reducing perceptions of the Soviet menace, the Western 
harmony that "was once virtually automatic can no longer 
be taken for granted." Free governments cannot now rely 
on the "imperative of alliance solidarity," either to maintain 
their military and political unity or, more pertinently, to 
keep disputes about other matters, such as tfade, in 
perspective and under control. 
Luttwak notes a phenomenon within the American-
European-Japanese Alliance, or security-based relationship, 
that he terms "economic brinkmanship." This practice has 
become very rewarding for some of its members in 
advancing their claims. The pattern of behavior, briefly, is 
this: "The greater the outcry, the more extreme the 
demands, the sooner would the imperative of alliance 
solidarity assert itself to insure that the loudest complainers 
were paid off." The Alliance, at least hitherto, had 
constituted a "strategic safety net" preventing the parties to 
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it from falling into a debilitatíng retaliatory cycle, such as 
the controversy over beef exports. "The beef-and-hormones 
dispute with Western Europe, with its abrupt diktats and 
open-ended threats, is a reminder of how cióse we are to 
the edge of the abyss," Luttwak writes, adding rather 
apocalyptically: "It is worth recalling that during the 
1920's-the last 'threatless' era-commercial competition 
quickly deteriorated into eQonomic warfare." 
More than the coherente of the American-European-
Japanese Alliance is alleged to be at stake. The regularity 
and predictability of international affairs generally is 
jeopardized. "If the Soviet Union were now to adopt the 
normal conduct of a great power, subject to normal 
inhibitions, world politics would drastically change. That, 
of course, has yet to happen," Luttwak acknowledges.^ But 
the unmistakable lesson of-previous history, as he reads it, 
is that it well could. 
If this line of reasoníng is correct, there is cause to be 
very anxious about the consequences of the apparent 
American "victory" in the Cold War. If a "threatless" world 
also will be a structureless world, then the international 
challenge facing the Bush administration may be far deeper 
than ra.ost commentators háve appreciated. The danger, 
however, is exaggerated. 
Coptrary to the gloomy prognostication of Luttwak, 
my own expectation is that, following a period of initial 
confusión in the NATO and U.S.-Japanese-security-treaty 
relationships, the basic structural features of the current 
free-world order will be maintained, and possibly even 
strengthened-wh a te ve r the kind or degree of reduction in 
the extemal Soviet threat. Such an interpretation of events 
rests on a more complex conception of the historical origins 
of present-day transatlantic and transpacific systems than 
Luttwak provides. 
It simply is a misreading of history tó attribute the 
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North Atlantic Alliance in particular--which, after all, was 
negotiated within four years of the cióse of the Secónd 
World War in which Germany was the main adversary— 
almost exclusively to the ideological and military challenge 
posed by the Soviet Union. For the French people 
especially, concern about Germany was hardly less grave. 
The 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk and the 1948 Brussels Pact-
precursors of the North Atlantic Treaty—both explicitly 
mentioned Germany as the adversary, and did not ñame 
the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat, undoubtedly, was a 
necessary condition of the formation of NATO, but it was 
not, by itself, a sufficient condition of it. The Germán and 
Soviet dangers were in many Western minds in fact 
intermingled: it was the fear of Soviet control of and in 
Germany, exploiting its resources and enlisting its 
manpower, that gave the French and other Western 
Europeans, and also many Americans, their nightmares. 
The root cause of the formation of NATO was a systemic, 
generic one: a pervasive feeling within the West of a need 
for a durable security arrangement for combining the 
western part of Europe with the reserve-force área of North 
America. This would be a strong and wide enough 
framework to preclude another breakdown, for the third 
time in the century, of the political order "balance of power" 
of Europe.^ The same basic motivation remains the 
foundation of NATO today, and it is sound. 
If it be feared that the smiles of Mikhail Gorbachev 
toward Western Europeans might result in their joining a 
"common European home" from the Urals to the Atlantic, it 
also should be kept in mind that a no less commodious 
Atlantic home, built by the Western wartime allies on the 
basis of their vital transoceanic experiences, has been in 
place for more than forty years.^ The "Atlantic Community" 
ideal is a political concept that has a historical, and even a 
geographical, legitimacy fuUy comparable to that of the 
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Soviet "European" visión.^ Where free human exchanges 
are possible, it makes little difference whether the médium 
is maritime or territorial. 
Spain, though the newest member of the NATO 
community itself, has perhaps the oldest national 
appreciation of the importance of Europe's sea-borne 
connection to the New World. Great Britain, another 
onetime seat of an overseas empire, has a similar continuing 
awareness--not limited to the "special relationship" with the 
United States--of Europe's westward-facing maritime 
reliances. This "Occidental" habit of thought has remained 
strong, even when "crises" in Atlantic Alliance politics occur, 
such as the 1956 Suez débácle and the 1966 French 
withdrawal from NATO's military structure. The more 
recent controversy over the basing of seventy-two U.S. F-16 
fighters at Torrejón was a difficulty which the Alliance, 
proving itself resilient, was able to absorb with considerable 
smoothness, even if not without additional fiscal expense. 
As Charles Krauthammer remarked soon afterward in Time. 
"The Western alliance is stronger than ever. Europe is 
embarked on full economic integration. NATO, whose 
imminent demise is annually declared by critics, has shown 
remarkable cohesiveness, withstanding with nary a blink the 
planned removal of an American air wing from Spain and 
its relocation in Italy."^ 
Other, more recent intra-AUiance tensions, such as 
that arising from the Federal Republic of Germany's request 
for early East-West negotiations to elimínate short-range 
nuclear weapons from Germán territory, have been 
managed most impressively as well.^ Even the issue of 
Germán reunification, revived because of current rapid 
changes in East Germany, so far has not upset NATO. The 
F.R.G.'s Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, voluntarily has made 
clear: "The Federal Republic of Germany will remain 
irrevocably anchored in a strong and lasting relationship 
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with the Atlantic alliance and in the community of valúes 
of the free peoples of the VVest."^ ' Cooperation still 
predominates over competition within the North Atlantic 
Alliance, despite the prospect of a continued abatement of 
Soviet military pressure from the outside. 
Vil 
In the midst of the above contrary trends and 
contradictory analyses, what has been the position of the 
United States government? A fact too readily overlooked in 
the excitement of a new administration is that American 
foreign policy, even before George Bush and his colleagues 
entered office, already had been adjusted to fit many of the 
complex realities noted above, and some others besides. In 
the field of foreign policy at least, the second Reagan term 
was not a "lame duck" presidential period. Even though 
their doing so meant overturning some of their own 
doctrinaire positions assumed earlier in the 1980s, President 
Reagan together with Secretary of State George Shultz by 
January 1989 had in many ways altered the very terms of 
debate over American foreign policy. 
Their "helpful gifts" to the new Bush administration 
included first and foremost the improved American 
relationship with the Soviet Union, a country President 
Reagan earlier had denounced as the "evil empire." The 
INF arms-control agreement and the May 1988 Reagan 
summit trip to Moscow put his strong seal of approval on 
another period of Soviet-American good feelings--"Détente 
II," it has been called. These actions inevitably put a certain 
pressure on President Bush to follow in his predecessor's 
outsized footsteps. As Senator John McCain, an Arizona 
Republican, commented, Bush inherits "some very high 
expectations for progress on arms-control issues." Jack 
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Beatty, writing in The Atlantic Monthly. observed that 
"Reagan imparted a political momentum to progress on 
nuclear-arms reduction that, if Bush moves to exploit it, 
could yield a high-profile political victory early in his term, 
perhaps even by the end of the year." There was even talk 
of a Nobel Peace Prize.^-
Secretary Shultz's own "gifts" to his successor. James 
Baker, widened the range of options for President Bush's 
cióse friend and campaign manager, also a former White 
House chief of staff and a Treasury Secretary. Baker 
generally was perceived as a man of a very pragmatic turn 
of mind, a dealmaker--not unprincipled but ready to 
conclude workable agreements that met domestic political 
criteria as well as good-policy standards. He plainly 
intended to be the President's man in the State Department, 
rather than the State Department's representative to the 
President. Preferring to work with a small "inner circle" of 
loyal aides, he would not be likely to become a captive of 
bureaucratic tradition.^^ 
One of Shultz's helpful moves was at last to approve 
the scheduling of a session of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Moscow for 1991. 
This issue had delayed the conclusión of the current CSCE 
session in Vienna and, as a consequence, the beginning of 
CSCE-spofisored talks on conventional military forcé 
reductions in Europe--a new and wider international forum 
for negotiations on that critical subject. Shultz took into 
account Moscow's cessation of radio jamming, its reléase of 
some political prisoners, and its partial relaxation of 
emigration limits. Apparently deciding that he had 
"squeezed" as much as he could from the Russians on these 
points, he consented to the 1991 CSCE Moscow meeting. 
Thereby, he probably allowed Baker to begin conventional-
arms negotiations without being encumbered by "linkage" to 
human-rights questions, and spared the new Secretary and 
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his team some right-wing criticism. 
Other particular matters that Shultz thoughtfuUy 
adjusted in his final weeks in office concerned the Near 
East, Southern África, and Libya. Specifically, he permitted 
the start of a U.S. political dialogue with the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO). He drew to a cióse 
Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker's eight-year diplomatic 
mediation of the interrelated Angola and Namibia problems. 
Perhaps most interestingly, he amended U.S. economic 
sanctions against the Qaddafi regime so as to allow 
American oil companies to opérate their concessions in 
Libya through third-country subsidiarles. "George Shultz 
has never liked economic sanctions," as one U.S. official 
explained. "He felt this was a mess he helped créate, and 
he wanted to clean it up before he left."^ 
VIII 
Thus given a pardal clean slate, what vvill the Bush 
administraron ultimately decide-and be able--to write on it? 
What is likely to be George Bush's own distinctive 
contribution to American foreign policy and to the larger 
history of the world? The indications were much less clear 
during the early months of the new administration than 
might have been expected, given the fact that Bush had 
been Vice President in the preceding administration and 
that there was continuity of Republican party control over 
the executive branch. There was no definitive "hundred 
days," a quick succession of decisive actions establishing a 
pattern for future policy.^ '^ 
The uncertainty regarding the direction of Bush's 
foreign policy was to some extent a result of difficulties 
encountered in the appointment of certain key officials, 
especially a Secretary of Defense. Following the politically 
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embarrassing defeat in the Senate of the President's first 
nominee, former Senator John Tower of Texas, the less 
personally controversial Richard Cheney, a Wyoming 
Congressman and a former White House chief of staff 
under President Gerald Ford, was designated. Owing in 
part to Cheney's position as the second-ranking figure in 
the Republican leadership in the House, his confirmation 
was almost a foregone conclusión, and he was duly 
installed. Cheney's views, although generally conservative, 
were not well known. It was evident that he would have 
to spend much time dealing with the Pentagon's mounting 
budgetary and management problems.^ 
The appointment to the position of National Security 
Adviser of Brent Scowcroft, a former U.S. Air Forcé 
Lieutenant General who previously had served in that role 
in the Ford administration, provided somewhat clearer 
signáis. During the early Reagan administration. General 
Scowcroft had chaired the "Scowcroft Commission," which 
had recommended placement of the new multi-warhead MX 
missile in Minuteman silos and had provided a rationale 
that theoretically closed the question of a "window of 
vulnerability." He also had been a member of the three-
man 'Tower Commission" (chaired by John Tower) which 
had looked into the Iran-Contra affair and the integrity of 
the NSC machinery.^^ 
Another significant second-level appointment was that 
of Lawrence S. Eagleburger, a retired sénior career diplomat, 
to be Deputy Secretary of State. A former U.S. Ambassador 
to Yugoslavia, he was especially familiar with European 
affairs. Eagleburger ventured the early prognostication that 
"West-West" relations would be the biggest problem facing 
" the Bush administration. He evidently feared a new spirit 
of divisiveness within the Alliance over relations with the 
Soviet Union. "East-West" and "North-South" relations could 
be managed if relations with allies could. His own 
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skepticism regarding the motivation behind Gorbachev's 
reforms was evident: "The only purpose that explains his 
policy is to créate a stronger, more efficient Soviet Union."^ 
The fact that both Scowcroft and Eagleburger lately 
had been cióse working colleagues of Dr. Henry A. 
Kissinger, as fellow executives in the consulting firm of 
Kissinger Associates, suggested a Kissingerian, or heavily 
"geopolitical," influence over the Bush administration's 
foreign policy. It further raised the intriguing question of 
the return to official Ufe in Washington of Dr. Kissinger 
himself. Past personal relations between Bush and 
Kissinger, combining with the new President's determination 
to conduct his own foreign policy free of burdensome 
historical associations with the Vietnam war and "Detente I," 
made such a prospect unlikely—although it cannot be ruled 
out.3' 
Given President Bush's own strong interest in 
international affairs, the best indication of the inclinations 
of the new administration in foreign policy may be the 
previous international experiences of George Bush himself— 
for the most part in diplomacy, rather than in policy-
making. He had the career background to be America's 
first modern "diplomat President." There probably has been 
no U.S. President, since the early days of the republic when 
having served as Secretary of State was considered a major 
qualification for the Presidency, who was more 
knowledgeable about international matters and, hardly less 
important, more familiar with the leading persons around 
the world who dealt with them.'*" Bush stands, in this 
regard, in complete contrast to his immediate presidential 
predecessors, Ronald Reagan and also Jimmy Cárter, whose 
previous political experience had been at the state level. 
Bush's most distinctive earlier foreign experience was 
his tour of duty, in 1974 and 1975, as head of the U.S. 
Liaison Office in Beijing, established following the historie 
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trip to China of President Richard Nixon in 1972. President 
Carter's formal recognition of the People's Republic of 
China in 1979 raised the office to embassy status. Bush had 
requested the Beijing post, in preference to more visible and 
prestigious diplomatic assignments in Europe, for example. 
While in China he had tried to be "an active liaison officer," 
as he later described his image of his role. Kissinger, then 
Secretary of State and very protective of his own 
relationship with the P.R.C., "didn't think much" of Bush's 
gregarious approach, as Bush recalled. Kissinger once told 
him: "It doesn't matter whether they like you or not." 
Bush "disagreed." As he explained: "My purpose wasn't to 
win popularity contests in Beijing but to get to know the 
Chinese--and to get them to know Americans-at a personal 
level."'*' The statement epitomizes the Bush approach to 
International relations, in general. 
The occasion of the state funeral of Japan's Emperor, 
Hirohito, in February 1989 gave the President an early 
opportunity, by extending his Japan visit to China and also 
to South Korea, to renew oíd ties in Asia. His trip and his 
remarks there, though not highly planned, suggested in fact 
the beginnings of a U.S. effort to encourage a stronger and 
wider sense of Pacific community, as well as to consolídate 
the U.S. relationship with Japan. More traditional elements 
of American policy toward the región also were evident. 
The United States, as Bush pointedly declared during a 
stopover in Alaska on the way out, "is as much a Pacific 
nation as it is an Atlantic one." Moreover, as his visit 
would show, it intended "to stay a Pacific power."^^ 
Bush's emphasis nonetheless appeared to be not on 
the military aspects of America's Pacific policy but, rather, 
on its economic, ideological, and political facets. Northeast 
Asia as a whole then was undergoing important common 
developments—a process of marketization and 
democratization—that facilitated his traveling from Tokyo to 
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Beijing and Seoul on the same journey, despite the 
philosophical contradictions he encountered. "Of course, 
differences remain and work is yet to be done, opening 
foreign markets to U.S. competition, continuing to encourage 
the growth of democracy and human rights, strengthening 
our alliances," he reported when he returned. "But common 
ground was found." There had been "important symbols" 
on the trip, he said, probably referring to the transcendence 
of his own and other Americans' World War Il-related anti-
Japanese memories. He had come home "pleased with the 
progress made toward mutually beneficia! relationships with 
our allies and friends."" The word "mutually" here is 
worthy of note. The Bush trip indicated the possibility of 
future coordinaron, even integration, of America's 
transpacific relationships (both "alliances" and "friendships"). 
Hitherto mostly bilateral, these perhaps somehow could be 
fitted together multilaterally.''^ 
President Bush's former service as U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, between 1971 and 
1973, also furnished a clue to possible future directions of 
American policy. Bush's experience in international-
organization diplomacy is almost unique among American 
politicians at the highest level, particularly among veterans 
of the generally "unilateralist" Reagan administration. It 
must be acknowledged that Bush, although an early believer 
in the UN, had been somewhat disillusioned by his 
experience there. He deplored its members' habit of "bloc" 
voting and also their indulgence in anti-American rhetoric. 
His worst memory was his defeat in a valiant, maybe 
quixotic effort on behalf of the "Dual Representation" of 
both the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's 
Republic of China in the organization. The majority of the 
United Nations' members would allow only the P.R.C. to 
belong.*^ 
"Like most Americans who had idealistic hopes for 
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the United Natíons when it was created in 1945, I'd 
undergone a sea change in attitude by the early 1970s," he 
later stated. "As 'the last best hope for peace' the UN was 
another light that failed." However, despite his sense that 
it was "largely ineffective--and sometimes 
counterproductive-in the political área," Bush ended up his 
tour at the UN being more a defender than a detracter of 
the institution. "What many Americans find hard to accept 
is that even if it doesn't live up to its original expectations, 
the UN still serves a valuable purpose," he remarked. He 
cited in particular its valuable peacekeeping activities as 
well as its worthy efforts in science, medicine, agriculture, 
space technology, and support for refugees and the hungry. 
These were áreas where "ideological differences can be held 
to a minimum."*"' 
It is indicative of President Bush's continuing regard 
for the UN that his first official dinner guest at the White 
House following the inauguration was UN Secretary-General 
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. The Peruvian diplomat and he had 
worked closely together in New York in the early 1970s. 
Although more symbolic than substantive, this gesture 
nonetheless expresses a sensitivity toward the UN 
community that seemed to promise greater support for it. 
It now remained for the Bush administraron, together with 
Congress, to make good on the unpaid American debt to 
the UN, both for its regular budget and for its peacekeeping 
costs/^ President Bush signified his willingness to help. 
The United Nations offered the Bush administration 
a forum for considering a much wider range of issues than 
had been addressed during the Reagan administration, with 
its heavier ideological agenda. Edward Luck, president of 
the United Nations Association of the United States of 
America, observed of the cióse relationship between Bush 
and Pérez de Cuéllar, that "their agendas-regional conflict, 
Chemical weapons, drugs, AIDS, the environment, human 
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rights, terrorism, and debt—converge in ways that could be 
mutually advantageous." Moreover: "They need each other, 
since neither has all the answers. Working with an 
unusually cooperative Kremlin, they could accomplish a 
great deal."''* 
No less pertinent, particularly in considering his 
personal conception of the future U.S. relationship with the 
Soviet Union, was Bush's period of service (1976-1977) as 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. "In the Ford 
Administration I was Director of the CÍA," he recalled, "and 
I wear that as a badge of honor. That job opened my eyes 
to the world as it is, not as we might want it to be." It 
gave a certain temper and technique to his relationship with 
the Soviet Union. "As the nation's chief intelligence officer, 
1 saw the reality of Soviet intentions, and how they are 
cloaked by disinformation and propaganda," he stated. "For 
example, in arms negotiations, the Soviets' overt agenda is 
to reduce nuclear weapons. We share that goal. But the 
Soviets' covert agenda, their unstated objective, is twofold: 
They want to drive a wedge between us and our allies, and 
they want to weaken the defenses of Western Europe."^' 
Bush's CÍA period appears also to given him a keener 
sense of "the Soviet threat" as a factor in American domestic 
politics. The New York Times political writer, R. W. Apple, 
has pointed out that Bush's service at the CÍA during the 
Ford presidency was the time when the detente policy 
inherited from the Nixon administration carne under attack 
from those, notably former California Governor Ronald 
Reagan, who advocated more rearmament against and more 
confrontation of Moscow. Governor Reagan nearly wrested 
the Republican presidential nomination from Ford, "an 
episode that left its mark, to a greater or lesser degree, on 
all the people in the Ford inner circle," Apple notes.^ In 
the 1980 presidential campaign, Bush, himself for the first 
time a candidate, was defeated in the primarles by a much 
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more anti-Soviet Reagan. Even if not actually traumatized 
by these political events, Bush's CIA-influenced professional 
cautíousness could only have been reinforced by them. 
In part, the Bush administration's hesitancy toward 
Moscow was a functional consequence of the "policy 
reviews" of defense programs and arms-control positions, as 
well as of basic Soviet thinking and behavior, that the 
President ordered to be undertaken. This laborious process, 
which seems to have shed very little new light (owing 
partly to the fact that holdovers from the Reagan 
administration had to do most of the assignments), caused 
weeks of delay. Predictably, the lessons learned from this 
exercise were cautionary, rather than visionary.^' Bush, 
having become accustomed to such systematic methods of 
analysis during his time as CÍA Director, may have in fact 
employed the "policy review" technique as much to impose 
his discipline on the U.S. federal bureaucracy —to make it 
his own-- as to try to indoc-trinate it. 
Such a constraint could only be temporarily effective. 
In a speech before a joint session on Congress on February 
9, President Bush indicated that decisions soon vvould be 
forthcoming regarding U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. 
"Prudence and common sense díctate that we try to 
understand the full meaning of the change going on there, 
reviev^ our policies carefully and proceed with caution," he 
emphasized. "But I have personally assured General 
Secretary Gorbachev that at the conclusión of such a 
review, we will be ready to move forward. We will not 
miss any opportunity to work for peace." 
As in his inaugural address, Bush expressed his 
determination to "negotiate from strength." He would 
"vigorously pursue" the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). 
He would "stand firm for self-determination and democracy 
in Central America, including in Nicaragua." He would 
"strengthen the alliance of the industrial democracies, as 
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solid a forcé for peace as the world has ever known." 
Referring perhaps to the wrangle with Western European 
countries over "beef hormones," he advised: "This is an 
alliance forged by the power of our ideáis, not the pettiness 
of our differences." He said that Secretary Baker shortly 
would visit Europe for consultations about "the wide range 
of challenges and opportunities we face together, including 
East-West relations." He was looking forward later to 
meeting with "our NATO partners."^-
When the policy review at last was completed, 
President Bush spoke more affirmalively about U.S. policy 
toward the Soviet Union. This he did early in May in a 
commencement speech in College Station, Texas. Forty 
years of perseverance in the policy of "containment," he 
argued in that address, had obliged the Soviet Union to 
confront the reality of its own internal contradictions. 
"Containment worked," he contended.^^ The Soviet Union 
was turning inward, as the craftsmen of that strategy—Harry 
Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, Arthur Vandenberg and 
Sam Rayburn, and George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and 
George Kennan--had predicted. In consequence: "We are 
approaching the conclusión of a historie postwar struggle 
between two visions-one of tyranny and conflict and one 
of democracy and freedom." 
It therefore now was possible, Bush proposed, to 
move "beyond containment." Rather than just constraining 
Soviet expansionism, "we seek the integration of the Soviet 
Union into the community of nations." Such an integration 
process would have to be carried out, however, 
reciprocally—step by step. He clearly expected Moscow to 
have to make the initial moves. These he actually 
stipulated for Gorbachev: first, greater reduction of Soviet 
military forces; second, respect for self-determination in 
Eastern Europe (specific abandonment of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine and dismantlement of the Iron Curtain); third. 
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diplomatíc collaboration in finding solutions to the world's 
regional disputes; fourth, political pluralism and respect for 
human rights within the Soviet Union itself; and, fifth, joint 
action in addressing global problems, including the 
international drug menace and dangers to the environment. 
"As the Soviet Union moves toward greater openness and 
democratization—as they meet the challenge of responsible 
international behavior-we will match their steps with steps 
of our own," Bush promised. "Ultimately, our objective is to 
welcome the Soviet Union back. into the world order."^ The 
strict new Bush posture, whose material difference from the 
oíd "containment" stance was not yet really evident, was 
characterized by skeptical commentators as "containment 
plus." 
IX 
President Bush's policy-a curious mixture of 
triumphalism and incrementalism—has been severely tested 
by v^orld events. In view of what was occurring 
internationally, particularly in East Asia and in Eastern 
Europe, it seemed at once boastful and too modest. That is, 
it exaggerated the effect of past U.S. policy and it 
minimized the possible effectiveness of future U.S. policy. 
Añ underlying cause of the puzzling inconsistency 
betv^^een the Bush administration's philosophical temerity 
and political timidity to date is, as suggested earlier in this 
essay, the President's lack of confidence regarding the actual 
power and influence of the United States, allegedly in 
"decline" and clearly needing economic readjustment. Of 
immediate concern to the administration was the Gramm-
Rudman budget-balancing law.^ ^ The President found 
himself under a legal obligation to cut government costs 
while at the same time honoring his Inauguration Day 
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promise of more resources for the natíon's social-welfare 
needs, even while keeping the nation's defenses strong. 
Obviously, something had to give. 
In effect, the Bush administration is reversing the 
priorities of the Reagan administration. It will have to rob 
the foreign-affairs budget-notably defense, and possibly 
foreign aid-in order to pay the cost of renewing the 
country's domestic programs, which voluntary activities ("a 
thousand points of light") could only supplement. As a 
result, the United States probably is considering its "last 
Cold War defense budget."^ In such circumstances, it has 
been difficult for President Bush and his colleagues even to 
consider taking bold foreign-policy initiatives, with 
substance. The U.S. government, having grown dependent 
on external borrowing to cover its fiscal shortfalls, has 
become virtually broke. "How can you be a superpower," 
asked a Swedish economist succinctly, "when you are out of 
pocket?"^^ 
As inhibiting as have been budgetary constraints on 
President Bush's foreign policy, these probably have 
restricted its development less than the stunning effect of 
what today is happening in the world. Although 
professedly open to the possibility of change, the Bush 
administration has not anticipated the scope, the depth, and, 
most of all, the suddenness of recent International 
occurrences. This is the more obvious reason for the 
President's hesitaron to proffer solutions, v^hich quickly 
could be overtaken by events. Some of these developments 
are unwelcome. They shake the very premises of the Bush 
administration's sanguine outlook. 
The first, and most sobering, shock to the Bush 
policy's master assumption-viz., that of the universalization 
of Western liberal democracy, as a concomitant of the 
diffusion of free-market principles-was "Tiananmen Square." 
The brutal crackdown on gatherings of students in Beijing 
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and other Chinese cities by a communist government 
determined to retain total control, even at the risk of 
significant gains achieved from internal economic reform 
and through liberalized trade, challenged any easy notion of 
history as an inevitable, unassisted process of 
"freedomization." President Bush, seeking "a proper, 
prudent balance" in his response to the events in China, 
admitted: "The process of democratization of communist 
societies will not be a smooth one, and we must react to 
setbacks in a way which stimulates rather than stifles 
progress toward open and representative systems."^ 
Thus he approved only limited sanctions, including 
the suspensión of military-equipment exports, and insisted 
on maintaining an ambassador-level U.S. diplomarte 
representation in Beijing. He kept up ambassadorial ties 
partly in order not to seem to abandon the students who 
bravely had risen in protest. There was a geopolitical 
purpose, too. He intended to protect the "constructive 
relationship" that had been built up by the United States 
and the People's Republic of China over the past two 
decades.^' His decisive handling of this problem reflected 
his own personal experience in dealing with the Chinese 
leadership. It also revealed his retrospective sense of having 
a stake in the existing U.S.-Chinese "relationship," conceived 
of as a valué in itself and as a means of exercising political 
and economic leverage. 
Critics, including some noted China experts, accused 
him of placing too much emphasis on geostrategic and 
commercial calculations-both unrealistic at a time of 
receding Soviet pressures and declining prospects of 
exploiting the vast China market~and not enough stress on 
human-rights considerations, from which might emerge the 
bond that could unite America with a post-revolutionary 
China." The fault, once again, was widely thought to be 
Bush's problem with "the visión thing." It probably was at 
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least as much, however, America's weakness in dealing with 
the communist Chinese. In the assessment of one White 
House official: "The U.S. has no influence over the Chinese 
governmenfs behavior. Zero. None." A presidential 
adviser said: "For the Chinese leaders this is a battle to the 
death and they're not particularly interested in what we 
think of them."" 
One consequence of the chilling of the U.S.-P.R.C. 
friendship owing to the Beijing governmenfs acts of 
totalitarian repression was a heightened sensitivity in the 
United States, on the popular level as well as the official 
level, to the U.S. relationship with Japan. "We thought we 
were on a real roll with China, and look what happened," 
said one U.S. official. "Now, our 35-year relationship with 
Japan takes on more importance." Public-opinion poli data 
indicating that Americans had come to regard "economic 
competitors like Japan" as constituting a greater threat to 
U.S. national security than "military adversarles like the 
Soviet Union" now seemed almost dangerous." No longer 
would it be possible to let disputes over trade matters or 
joint development projects involving high technology, such 
as a controversial plan to help the Japanese build a new 
fighter aircraft, the FSX, get out of hand. "In considering 
FSX," as Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger said, "we 
must keep in mind the larger dimensions of our security ties 
and our overall relationship with Japan."*^ After Tiananmen 
Square, such advice carried weight. 
A second challenge to the Bush administration's 
freedom-oriented, beyond-containment policy was what 
might be called the summons to multilateralism-to accept 
the increased need to subordínate national independence of 
action ("sovereignty") to the disciplines of large-scale 
International cooperation in managing global-systemic 
problems. President Bush, speaking to the 44th General 
Assembly of the United Nations on September 25, himself 
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has urged the members of that body to go beyond the 
advancement of "freedom" to confront "the global challenges 
of the 21st century: economic health, environmental well-
being, the great questions of war and peace.." More 
specifically, he commended the Brady plan as a way of 
reducing the debt burdens of developing nations. He 
reaffirmed the U.S. government's commitment to phase out 
production of chlorofluorocarbons by the year 2000 and its 
intention to amend the U.S. Clean Air Act. He proposed a 
treaty to ban all chemical weapons within a ten-year period, 
offering to begin destroying American chemical-weapons 
stockpiles at once. He placed his emphasis on regional 
conflicts which, because of a worrisome combination of "oíd 
and unappeasable animosities and modern weapons of mass 
destruction," threatened the peace of the world as a whole 
as never before. The United States would take "an active 
role" in settling the regional conflicts, he pledged. The 
United Nations must go beyond mere "peacekeeping" to 
actual "peacemaking."" 
None of these commitments, however, implied a 
significant cession of political authority to United Nations, 
or even designated that body as the primary instrument for 
handling the "global" questions President Bush identified. 
His specific proposals themselves, too, were far more modest 
than many proponents of debt forgiveness, 
chlorofluorocarbon- and carbon-dioxide reduction, and a 
chemical-weapons production ban, respectively, had been 
hoping for. The central world question of U.S.-Soviet 
strategic arms control scarcely was mentioned, apart from an 
allusion to the fact a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting recently 
had been scheduled for the spring or summer of 1990. 
Moreover, despite President Bush's own stated wish, the 
U.S. Congress had not met, ñor did it seem likely fully to 
meet, the large outstanding U.S. financial obligation to the 
United Nations organization.*^ It is not surprising, therefore. 
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that President Bush's appearanee, though warmly welcomed, 
did not usher in the new era of global management that 
many believers in that possibility envisioned. 
A third, and probably the most serious challenge to 
President Bush's foreign policy, was the question of how, 
when, where, and to what extent to respond to the 
dramatic changes that were occurring within the Soviet 
sphere, most notably the rise of nationalism and reform 
movements in the countries of Soviet-controlled Eastern 
Europe. Although it was possible to attribute these 
breathtaking developments-the formation of a Solidarity-led 
government in Poland, the abandonment of the ñame 
"Communist" by the ruling party in Hungary, and the East 
Germán government's decisión to open its border (including 
the Berlin Wall) with West Germany-simply to the human 
desire for "freedom," they also indicated the forcé of more 
traditional factors, with divisive as well as unifying 
potential. Par from marking the "end" of history, as Francis 
Fukuyama hypothesized, the events in Eastern Europe 
equally could be regarded as signifying the 
recommencement of history in that long-stagnated región of 
the world." Forces were being released there which went 
well beyond the libertarían wish for "free markets, free 
speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will 
unhampered by the state" that President Bush had 
celebrated in his inaugural address. 
That he at least sensed the power of these other 
urges--nationalist sentiment, class consciousness, religious 
feeling--was evident in the very restrained language he used 
when he visited Poland in July. Speaking to the Parliament 
there, he warned that, "even under the best circumstances," 
representative government has its own challenges. "It 
requires patience, tolerance, and give-and-take between 
political opponents." The material assistance that he offered 
to Poland-part of the U.S. governmenfs "action plan" for 
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that country-consisted of a carefully measured $100 million 
enterprise fund and a $15 million environmental grant for 
the city of Krakow. The rest of his support consisted 
mainly of promised encouragement of further help from 
other governments and international institutions.*^ 
Subsequently, when Bush arrived in París for the 
seven-power Economic Summit meeting at the time of the 
celebration of the French Revolution Bicentennial, he made 
it plain to his colleagues, particulady the EC members, that 
he regarded them as equal partners in bringing about a 
"Europe whole and free." Somewhat reluctantly, he deferred 
to the European Community, with its greater stake in a 
reunited Europe, its practica! experience in dealing with the 
Eastern European nations, and its impressive capital and 
technological assets, to be coordinator of international aid to 
Poland, Hungary, and perhaps other Eastern bloc countries 
undertaking liberal reforms. In the process, Bush 
unequivocally endorsed the cause of European integratíon. 
"Let me say clearly a stronger Europe, a more united 
Europe, is good for my country," he said in the Netherlands 
before departing for the United States. "It's a development 
we welcome, a natural evolution within our alliance, the 
product of a true partnership 40 years in the making."** 
X 
How are we to assess the basic character of the Bush 
administration's foreign policy, at a time of extraordinary 
international change and America's own infernal 
adjustment? Has that policy been realistic, practical, and 
innovative, enlivening the world with a "new breeze" of 
statesmanship, or has it been sentimental, doctrinaire, and 
conventional, dominated by the winds of opinión and 
undercurrents of interest that have governed American 
67-
foreign policy in the past? Has it been forward-looking— 
anticipatory and constructive-or backward-looking—dilatory 
and reactive? Has it moved, as President Bush has 
promised, "beyond containment," or has it remained mired 
in Cold War history--so to speak, within containment? 
On the basis of the first ten months of the Bush 
administration, one must render a mixed judgment. In 
none of three áreas in which conditions appeared so 
promising in January-arms control, regional settlements, and 
trade negotiations-has significant progress been made. (A 
Nobel Prize will have to wait.) 
To be sure, President Bush attended a NATO Summit 
meeting in Brusseis at the end of May and unveiled a 
"revolutionary" plan for a conventional-arms agreement, to 
be concluded within "6 months or maybe a year." He did, 
thereby, temporarily seize the diplomatic "offensive." The 
impracticability of such a rapid negotiation on this subject, 
which involves all twenty-three countries of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact, was bound soon to become evident. No such 
comprehensive accord on conventional armed forces has 
been concluded at Vienna. Ironically, one of the reasons 
for delay is the possibility that non-negotiated unilateral 
reductions, made by one side or the other because of 
irresistible political or economic pressures, could overtake 
the formal East-West arms control process. In this case, the 
requirement of an actual agreement could impede the 
process of arms reduction. Arrangements for confidence-
building in the security field might be easier to complete. 
The United States and the Soviet Union have achieved a 
practical agreement regarding the avoidance of accidental 
confrontation between their own military forces, but no 
large-scale U.S.-Soviet pact, on strategic nuclear weapons 
themselves, yet has emerged. The Bush administration 
insists on a conventional-arms agreement first, on the theory 
that an overwhelming nuclear deterrent still is necessary to 
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offset the Soviet Union's continuing conventional-force 
advantages. "While Washington dithers," observes the New 
York Times in an editorial, "not a single warhead aimed at 
the U.S. has been eliminated after nine years of 
negotiating."^ 
Progress toward pacification of troubled regions—the 
Middle East, southern África, and Southeast Asia~also has 
been limited. In some cases, notably Central America, some 
of the political movement actually has been retrograde. A 
bipartisan agreement achieved with Congress early in the 
Bush term to give only humanitarian support to the 
Nicaraguan Contra forces was jeopardized by renewed 
violence in several parts of Central America. The fighting 
in El Salvador, in particular, has worsened. The Reagan-era 
obsession with the Sandinista threat, seen to be responsible 
for much of the unrest in the región, continúes to preclude 
the Bush administration's strong support for international 
negotiations looking toward peace and development in 
Central America.^ " 
On the field of international trade, too, few advances 
have been made. Early in October the United States 
concluded a new trade-and-investment agreement with 
México, aimed at identifying specific industrial sectors which 
might benefit from a mutual lowering of tariffs. This 
facilitating arrangement will not necessarily result, however, 
in a broad pact on bilateral free trade, analogous to the 
U.S.-Canadian agreement.^' America's economic relations 
with the European Community remain difficult. The 
Secretary of Commerce, Robert Mosbacher, told a House 
Foreign Affairs subcommittee that "European integration can 
be a great thing." However, if the Europeans continued to 
hammer away at new requirements for local "European 
content," as in the áreas of televisión programming and 
semiconductor manufacturing, "we will have to take a 
whole new look at it and think about it differently."^ The 
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fact that some of these restrictive European measures were 
aimed primarily at Japanese, rather than American, 
producers, only compounded the difficulty, making bilateral 
U.S.-EC discussions seem beside the point. 
Prompted by the dramatic events overseas and by 
fiscal and other pressures at home, the Bush administration, 
so far, has exhibited a pattern in its diplomacy of reacting, 
rather than acting, with sudden initiatives-as if to cover its 
previous apparent indecisión and lassitude." Thus, for 
example, President Bush boldly announced his 
"Conventional Parity Initiative" in Brussels in May. 
Secretary Baker, on the defensive because of Democratic 
charges that he and his colleagues have seemed almost 
nostalgic about the Cold War, has emphasized what the 
administration is doing "creatively" to respond to proposals 
coming from the Soviet Union7^ 
President Bush's surprise announcement on October 
31 that he would join President Gorbachev at a meeting 
("the saltwater summit") off Malta at the beginning of 
December is perhaps the most egregious case of all, 
although he and his staff insisted that he had been 
contemplating such a rendezvous with the Soviet leader 
since his NATO trip to Brussels in May and his subsequent 
journey to Eastern Europe and the Economic Summit. 
Responding to a question about whether this seemingly 
abrupt get-together was a response to criticism of his being 
"too timid" regarding the Eastern European situation and 
toward Gorbachev himself, Bush acknowledged that he had 
"elected to remain very quiet in the face of a good deal of 
sentiment that we were missing an opportunity." This had 
not "perturbed" him, however. He now was acting because 
he did not want, at a time of dynamic change, to "miss 
something," something he could best get "firsthand" from his 
Soviet counterpart. As he vividly said: "I don't want to 
have two gigantic ships pass in the night because of failed 
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communication." The purpose of this agenda-free "interim 
informal meetíng" with Gorbachev, as distínct from a fully 
prepared "arms control summit" to be held in 1990, Bush 
explained, was mainiy "to allow us to become better 
acquainted with one another and to deepen our respective 
understanding of each other's views."^ 
Whatever its exact origin or the motive behind it, 
President Bush's decisión thus to meet with President 
Gorbachev clearly marked an end to his administration's 
vacillation about whether or not to "support" (rather than 
merely to witness) the changes occurring within the Soviet 
sphere. Unmistakably, he has chosen the more active 
course—the one more consistent with his own open, 
enthusiastic, and trusting personality. "Good will begets 
good will," he had said in his inaugural. Thus it would 
appear that the forty-first President in his foreign policy has 
crossed over into a "post-historical" realm of possible new 
forms of internationa! cooperation, in direct U.S.-Soviet 
dealings and perhaps also in various multilateral settings, 
such as the CSCE context and the UN. As he said in a 
televised address to the American people on the eve of 
Thanksgiving Day, "We can now daré to imagine a new 
world..."^* 
In many minds, particularly in Europe, there was a 
suspicion, however, that any direct American-Soviet 
discussion would prove to be a continuation of "history"-
that is, of great-power domination of world events. The 
idea of a Bush-Gorbachev conclave on board ship suggested 
to those who cannot forget the past an attempt at 
American-Soviet condominium over Europe and Asia—a new 
Yalta ("It Rhymes with Malta").^ However benign in 
purpose, an arrangement of this kind now would be wholly 
unacceptable internationally. It could involve a subtle 
compromise of American principies (if not mentioned) and 
a neglect of interests of others (if not invited or consulted). 
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Mindful of such suspicions, Bush in his Thanksgiving 
message promised "no surprises." He assured those fearing 
another Yalta: "We are not meetíng to determine the future 
of Europe-after all, the peoples of Europe are determining 
their own future."^* 
Paradoxically, President Bush's decisión to pay closer 
attention to events in the East could shift the focus of 
American foreign policy to developments within the West 
itself. In the long run, American relations with Bonn, 
London, Paris, Rome, Ottawa, and Tokyo may be even more 
important—in the sense of being more productive—than 
relations with Moscow or Beijing. A no less promising Une 
of diplomacy than the current movement toward a limited 
U.S.-Soviet entente, it therefore might be argued, is the 
evolution that is occurring, almost without being noticed, 
toward a consensual, not merely consultative, American-
European-Japanese relationship. Despite disagreements on 
commercial and other lesser matters, the so-called Trilateral 
pattern of international cooperation—based on NATO and 
the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, and also on the economic 
bonds across the Atlantic and Pacific—would seem actually 
to have been strengthened, rather than weakened, by the 
replacement of the Soviet "enemy" by a different Russia. 
A deepened, and perhaps even more fofmalized, 
mutual commitment among the United States, Western 
Europe, and Japan--an "Economic Summit" Community, in 
effect-is needed for many reasons, some of them only 
indirectly related to the East-West conflict that has 
dominated most of the post-Second World War period. This 
strong grouping alone commands the resources—economic 
and technological and also political-that are needed to meet 
future global challenges, including planetary environmental 
problems." It is clear that the United States-in "decline" if 
assessed in a competitive but not in a cooperative 
international context—no longer can meet these alone. 
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Europe and Japan must be viewed now solely as partners 
and not as rivals. 
The Bush administration actually has worked to build 
such a three-contínent alliance, but without the architectural 
visión needed to complete it. Its preoccupation has been 
with events in the Soviet sphere-the principal mistake, too, 
of some of the originators of the "containment" strategy. 
Alliance-building, seemingly a backward step, also can be a 
move forward, as Truman, Eisenhower, Vandenberg, 
Rayburn, Marshall, Acheson, and Kennan in their day 
demonstrated. NATO, an outgrowth of war, became a 
framework for peace. Not only a basis for International 
order, an alliance can become international order itself.*" 
Today, a new world construction is needed: one that 
would include, as full equals, the leading countries of 
Western Europe joined formally with Japan." Participation 
by the United States in building such a new free-world 
cooperative order would bar a return to the unilateralist 
policies that still exercise some attraction for American 
foreign-policy makers and the American public. Such 
tendencies could be strengthened by an inward-turning 
China and Soviet Union. Far better would it be to concert 
with allies, particularly those in Western Europe, North 
America^ and Japan, in forming what the Bush 
administration calis a "commonwealth of free nations," as an 
inspiring world counter-attraction.*^ 
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